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Introduction 
Trade policy is a classic field for the study of private influence on policy-making. 
Firms and industries can gain clear advantages by protecting their markets from 
foreign competition or by gaining access to other countries. A large portion of the 
literature on international political economy therefore explains policy choices with 
reference to the demands of constituent interests (see Frieden and Martin 2002). For 
anybody interested in business lobbying, trade policy would seem to be the most 
appropriate place to start. 
And yet, comparing trade policy lobbying in the U.S. and the EU leaves many 
observers surprised. Aggressive business lobbying on trade issues is much less 
common in Brussels than it is in Washington, D.C. (e.g. Coen 1999; cf. Woll 2006). 
Shaffer (2003: 6) underlines that U.S. firms and trade associations are very proactive 
in business–government relations on trade policy. This “bottom-up” approach 
contrasts with the “top down” EU approach where public authority, in particular the 
European Commission, plays the predominant entrepreneurial role.  
While the U.S. Trade Representative responded to onslaughts of private 
sector lobbying reinforced by congressional phone calls and committee 
grillings, the Commission had to contact firms to contact it (Shaffer 
2003: 70). 
Indeed, the European Commission has made a concerted effort to integrate 
firms and other private actors into the trade policy-making process in order to gain 
bargaining leverage not simply vis-à-vis third countries, but also over its own member 
states (Van den Hoven 2002; Elsig 2007). By helping to elaborate policy solutions, 
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interest group participation increases the legitimacy of the Commission on external 
trade issues. 
This reverse lobbying is not without consequences. While firms do 
increasingly seize the opportunities available to them at the supranational level, EU 
trade policy lobbying is marked by a particular logic. Firms face a trade-off between 
pressing for immediate advantages and responding to the interests of the European 
Commission, which promises them access to the policy-making process (Broscheid 
and Coen 2003). Since the Commission is not immediately accountable to 
constituency interests, it can select interest groups and firms that it prefers to work 
with and ignore others (Grande 1996). In selecting private partners, the Commission 
follows two objectives. First, it requires technical expertise to develop its policy 
proposals (Bouwen 2002). Second, and on trade issues in particular, it is interested in 
finding pan-European solutions to prevent disputes between the member states that 
would risk stalling trade negotiations (Shaffer 2003: 78-79). When protectionist 
measures depend on national boundaries, industry privileges are likely to conflict with 
the Commission’s goals. Firms therefore have to decide between lobbying for their 
immediate advantage at the risk of being ignored, and framing their demands in terms 
of a pan-European interest even if they are not certain of obtaining an advantage. 
This logic creates two distinct channels for trade policy lobbying in the EU. A 
firm or industry interested in classic protectionism is most successful when it uses a 
national lobbying strategy directed at the member states and ultimately the Council of 
Ministers. Supranational lobbying, in turn, requires framing demands to include a 
pan-European dimensions. Lobbyists thus have to find ways of proposing pan-
European protectionism, most commonly in the form of pan-European trade 
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regulation (Young 2004). Alternatively, they can lobby for trade liberalization in 
order to establish or maintain contacts with the European Commission and then hope 
to integrate more precise demands in the details of trade regulation or the 
implementation of agreements. 
By studying the Europeanization of trade policy and the instruments firms 
employ to affect EU trade policy, a first part of this paper underlines the complexity 
individual firms have to manage in order to influence the Community stance on 
international trade negotiations. As an illustration of the EU trade policy lobbying 
logic, a second part then turns to concrete policy examples and compares the 
protectionist lobbying on agriculture and textiles and clothing with the lobbying on 
service trade liberalization in financial services and telecommunications. The 
conclusion discusses the extent to which the findings on business lobbying have 
implications for other actors seeking to affect trade policy, most notably NGOs or 
public interest groups. 
1. Trade policy lobbying in the multi-level system 
Trade policy is one of the most integrated policy areas in the EU, and yet the 
struggle over the competence distribution between the supranational institutions and 
the member states is crucial for understanding lobbying in this domain. Before turning 
to the key instruments for corporate lobbying on EU trade, it is therefore necessary to 
understand the Europeanization of trade policy and the history of competence 
delegation from the member states to the EU Institutions.  
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1.1. The integration of trade policy-making 
The common commercial policy is as old as the European Economic 
Community itself. With the Treaty of Rome in 1957, member states agreed that a 
customs union requires a common external tariff, common trade agreements with 
third countries and uniform application across member states (Elsig 2002; Meunier 
2005). They granted the European institutions the right to speak on their behalf on 
these issues in external trade negotiations.1 Initially, this authority applied to tariff 
rates, anti-dumping and subsidies, which were indeed the main stakes in early 
multilateral trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). During the Tokyo Round of GATT (1973-9) and especially during the 
Uruguay Round (1986-94), non-tariff barriers to trade started to gain importance, 
including health, environmental and social aspects of trade policy, and the domestic 
regulatory issues applying to the trade in services. European trade authority did not 
apply to many of these issues, which pushed the Community to redefine trade 
competences and the degree of delegation from the member states to the EU. In 
particular, it stirred up a debate over which issues should fall under “exclusive” or 
“mixed” competence (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 1999; Meunier 2000a).  
Mixed competence means that trade authority is delegated on an ad hoc basis 
to the Community. The setting of objectives and the ratification of the negotiation 
results are subject to a unanimous vote by the Council, whereas both require only a 
                                                 
1 Articles 131-135 (ex 110-116) of the Treaty on European Union. Article 300 (ex 
228) provides the supranational institutions with powers to conclude trade agreements 
with third countries.  
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qualified majority under exclusive competence. Over time, many areas of mixed 
competence have been dealt with pragmatically at first, by letting the Commission 
negotiate without fully resolving the competence dispute. For the results to be 
adopted, however, the legal competence question has become pressing. When the 
European Court of Justice decided effectively against an automatic expansion of trade 
competences in 1994, the Commission and the member states first agreed on a code of 
conduct and later adopted a special competence transfer procedure in 1996 (Elsig 
2002: 90-101; Meunier 2000b: 338-40). It was not until 2003 that the Treaty of Nice 
finally amended Article 133 and provided for the exclusive competence over services 
and intellectual property rights, with the exception of cultural and audio-visual 
services. The struggle underlines how heavily disputed the transfer of authority is. 
Delegation is a delicate matter, even in this highly integrated policy domain, and 
control mechanisms employed by member states are tight (De Bièvre and Dür 2005). 
The various control mechanisms become evident when one considers the 
different stages in the trade policy-making cycle. Woolcock (2000) distinguishes 
between (1) the setting of objectives, (2) the conduct of negotiations and (3) the 
adoption of results. The negotiation objectives are decided by the General Affairs 
Council of foreign ministers on the basis of a Commission proposal. Long before the 
formal adoption of a mandate, the Commission submits the proposal to the member 
states or, more precisely, to the national trade officials representing their governments 
on the Article 133 Committee (see Johnson 1998). Discussions during this phase are 
crucial, since the Commission can use the Article 133 Committee “as a sounding 
board to ensure that it is on the right track” (Shaffer 2003: 79). Trying to achieve a 
consensus on the mandate, the Article 133 Committee examines and amends the 
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proposal before handing it to the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER) and eventually the Council. Neither the European Parliament nor the 
general public participate formally in these early negotiations, which take place 
behind closed doors in order to shield the negotiation objectives from the trading 
partners. Woolcock (2000: 380) underlines how sharply the role of the European 
Parliament contrasts with the role of the U.S. Congress. Indeed, constituents lobbying 
their representatives have more direct control over the negotiating mandate in the 
U.S., where Congress can grant or withhold negotiation authority.  
The conduct of negotiations is the responsibility of the Commission, but even 
in areas of exclusive competence, consultation with the member states is crucial. The 
Article 133 Committee closely follows negotiations and the EU negotiation team 
meets daily with member state representatives. On sensitive issues such as service 
trade liberalization, trading partners have jokingly remarked that the Commission 
negotiates more with the member states than with the rest of the world (Woll 2004: 
227). The Commission, furthermore, tries to keep the External Economic Relations 
Committee of the European Parliament informed, even though the Parliament has no 
speaking rights during negotiations. Results are adopted by the General Affairs 
Council either by qualified majority voting under exclusive competence or by 
unanimous decision under mixed competence. In practice, however, consensus 
decisions are the norm (Woolcock 2000: 384).  
The importance of consensus between the member states applies equally to 
dispute settlement procedures. The most common way to bring a dispute to the WTO 
is for the Commission to initiate a case after consultation with the Article 133 
Committee. Formal procedure requires conflictual issues to be transferred to 
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COREPER and subsequently to the Council, should all other instances fail to resolve 
the dispute. In all the time the WTO has employed the dispute settlement procedure, 
this has only happened once.2 According to Shaffer (2003: 80) “neither committee 
members nor the Commission wish to transfer decision-making authority on trade 
matters from themselves, who are trade experts, to the Council, which consists of 
foreign affairs ministers.”  
To summarize, all stages of trade policy-making are characterized by an 
explicit desire to achieve and maintain consensus between the member states. The 
Commission cannot negotiate effectively if the EU member states are not behind the 
Community objectives. The interlocking of member state control and Commission 
authority are thus the two important dimensions of trade policy-making that interest 
groups and firms need to take into account if they wish to lobby effectively.  
1.2. Instruments and venues for corporate lobbying 
Consultation with private actors happens at various stages of EU trade policy-
making. Business interests, furthermore, affect the use of instruments of commercial 
defence, with which the Community tries to ensure equal competition for European 
and foreign firms. During trade negotiations and with respect to instruments of 
commercial defence, the solicitation by the Commission plays a key role in shaping 
the access of private actors to the policy-making process. 
                                                 
2 The EU complaint concerned the Helms-Burton Act, a US law sanctioning European 
foreign investors in Cuba. 
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1.2.1. Trade policy consultation with private actors  
Even though discussions between the Commission and the Article 133 
Committee on negotiation objectives are not public, the Commission consults 
extensively with firms, interest groups and NGOs in order to define specific stakes in 
its proposal. The EU consultation procedure is less formal than the system of Trade 
Advisory Committees in the U.S., but the Commission DG Trade and DG Industry 
maintain stable relations with groups such as the Union of Industries of the European 
Community (UNICE) or sectoral business associations. In 1998, the Commission tried 
to formalize its consultation and include a broader range of interest groups by 
instituting a Civil Society Dialogue on the upcoming round of negotiations (Van den 
Hoven 2002; De Bièvre and Dür 2007). Both business interests and public interest 
groups now participate in the Civil Society Dialogue. However, unlike the U.S. 
advisory system, the Commission is under no legal obligation to consult with the Civil 
Society Dialogue or to take its reports into consideration. 
Yet input from interest groups is valuable to the European Commission 
because it can help strengthen its negotiation stances vis-à-vis the member states and 
its trading partners. During the Uruguay Round, American negotiators cooperated 
closely with U.S. industry representatives. By contrast, the European business 
community was largely absent from the negotiations, despite the importance of 
multilateral trading stakes. Only UNICE declared in favour of the Commission 
position, and Jacques Delors complained openly about the lack of business support 
(Grant 1994: 83-5; Van den Hoven 2002: 10).  
Integrating business interests into the formulation of trade objectives therefore 
became an important goal for the European Commission in the 1990s. One of the 
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most noted initiatives was the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), founded by 
the U.S. Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown and European Trade Commissioner Sir 
Leon Brittan in 1995. The aim of the TABD was to bring together CEOs of American 
and European companies so that they could “pre-negotiate” issues relevant to 
transatlantic trade (Coen and Grant 2000; Cowles 2001). Similarly, the Commission 
encouraged the creation of other consultative associations, such as the European 
Service Forum, launched in January 1999. Initiatives such as the Civil Society 
Dialogue, the TABD or the European Service Forum illustrate the extent to which the 
Commission solicits participation from private actors and is willing to listen to their 
suggestions.  
However, individual groups have few means of putting direct pressure on the 
Commission to ensure that their demands will be taken into account. Within each 
member state, they can try to lobby their governments to affect the consensus between 
member states and the Commission during all phases of the policy cycle. They can 
also contact the European Parliament, which holds hearings and produces reports on 
trade issues, but this will do little more than shape the atmosphere in which EU 
objectives are determined and monitored (Woolcock 2000: 380). During the adoption 
phase, national parliaments and the European Parliament may play a greater role in 
the future, especially now that co-decision has been extended by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, but lobbying on trade policy still concentrates on the interchange 
between the Commission and member governments.  
1.2.2. Instruments of commercial defence 
In addition to ongoing trade negotiations, business lobbying can also target 
separate administrative procedures to ensure protection against ‘unfair’ foreign 
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competition. These instruments of commercial defence include anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties and the Trade Barriers Regulation of 1994. All of these 
administrative instruments require the identification of unfair competition practices, 
for which firms often have better information than governments. Over time, the EU 
has therefore tried to facilitate business input, so as to identify the greatest possible 
number of trade barriers or obstacles to competition. 
Anti-dumping measures, by far the most commonly used instrument of 
commercial defence, seek to punish exporters who sell their goods in the EU below 
the cost of their domestic production. The procedure begins with a complaint filed by 
industry representatives, which the Commission then decides to pursue or not. In the 
event of an investigation, the Commission studies in consultation with the national 
authorities whether there is evidence of dumping or injury to a European industry and 
seeks proof that the imposition of duties would be in the ‘Community interest’. 
Hearings are held to define the Community interest and to make it difficult for narrow 
protectionist interests to pursue anti-dumping actions (Woolcock 2000: 389-90). In 
fact, petitioners need to represent 50% of the injured industry, which makes it hard for 
individual firms to file a complaint (De Bièvre 2002: 86). After the imposition of a 
provisional duty by the Commission, the Council can decide by simple majority to 
reject the duty or to impose definite action. 
Until the beginning of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which replaced 
GATT in 1995, the commercial policy of the EU was relatively defensive. European 
trade officials had simultaneously to respond to demands for protection through anti-
dumping measures and to face the U.S., which actively sought to dismantle European 
trade barriers. Faced with “aggressive unilateralism” from the U.S. (Bhagwati and 
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Patrick 1991), the EU had sought to create a New Commercial Policy Instrument in 
1984, which tried to emulate U.S. business–government cooperation in identifying 
trade barriers. Unlike the U.S. model, the European procedure was marred with 
difficulties. In its ten year history, European firms filed only seven petitions (Shaffer 
2003: 84-94). In December 1994, the instrument was replaced by the Trade Barriers 
Regulation, which supporters were hoping would have more teeth. Innovations 
included the right of individual firms to petition the Commission directly, as may 
member governments. Furthermore, the petitioner no longer needs to provide proof of 
injury in order to file the complaint. The Trade Barrier Regulation requires the EU to 
exhaust all available multilateral dispute settlement procedures before resorting to 
unilateral action, which means that the procedure serves mostly as a means of 
identifying potential WTO dispute settlement cases.  
Indeed, soliciting industry help in identifying such cases was one of the main 
motivations behind the Trade Barrier Regulation. Traditional international trade 
disputes were initiated by the Commission in consultation with the Article 133 
Committee. Lacking close cooperation with business interests and trade associations, 
the EU was much less able to exploit the WTO Dispute Settlement Body when it was 
first established in 1995. The U.S., by contrast, brought several high-profile cases 
against the EU, and filed 8 of the first 15 complaints resulting in panels.3 Commission 
                                                 
3 The EU, in turn, brought only two, both jointly with the US, against third countries 
Gregory C. Shaffer (2003), Defending Interests: Public-Private Partnerships in WTO 
Litigation. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.. 
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officials felt that they needed to show more initiative and started to work actively to 
gain industry support and industry’s technical expertise on existing trade barriers. 
In February 1996, the Commission launched a new Market Access Strategy, 
tactically announced by Sir Leon Brittan as “D-Day for European Trade Policy” to an 
audience of major exporting companies (Shaffer 2003: 68). Within DG Trade, a 
Market Access Unit was established, the primary role of which was to interact with 
business actors to gather information on existing trade barriers. A central pillar of the 
work was the maintenance of a Market Access Database (see De Bièvre 2002: 96-
100).4 By centralizing information on trade barriers and involving firms in the 
collection of information, the EU was hoping to be able to counter the aggressive 
private–public partnerships of U.S. trade policy. As the administration of instruments 
of commercial defence shows, the Commission explicitly urged business participation 
in instruments of commercial defence in order to gain leverage over its trading 
partners.   
1.3. Trade-offs in multi-level trade lobbying 
The study of trade negotiations and of the administration of instruments of 
commercial defence illustrates how important business participation is for the internal 
and external negotiations of the European Commission. The solicitation is based on 
the Commission’s hopes of increasing its technical expertise, its legitimacy, its ability 
to maintain consensus among the member states and its leverage in trade negotiations. 
However, since Commission officials do not depend on re-election by constituency 
                                                 
4 Available from within the EU at http://mkaccdb.eu.int.  
 14
interests, firms cannot exert direct pressure on European officials to reinforce their 
demands. Therefore, business access is not automatic; it depends on the degree to 
which private actors can offer the elements the Commission is interested in. Business 
lobbying on trade is thus marked by a particular exchange logic, where firms provide 
expertise and support in order to gain access to the policy process (Bouwen 2002; 
Mahoney 2004). 
The selective access at the European level creates a two-channel logic for 
business lobbyists, which specifies different routes according to the content that firms 
seek to defend. Classical protectionism is easier to achieve in interaction with national 
governments, while cooperation on the elaboration of pan-European solutions 
promises an excellent working relationship with the European Commission. Pan-
European trade policy lobbying can be in support of liberalization, but it can also 
consist of regulatory protectionism that does not discriminate on the grounds of 
nationality but appeals instead to a greater Community interest. 
In fact, the tendency of the EU to defend a rather liberal external trade policy 
is relatively recent. Hanson (1998) argues that member states maintained national 
levels of protection in sensitive sectors throughout the 1970s and 1980s, despite the 
fact that a common commercial policy was enshrined in the Treaty of Rome. 
However, through the completion of the internal market, member states lost their 
ability to use national policy tools, in particular due to the legislative instruments 
available to the Commission in enforcing market integration (Schmidt 2000). 
Moreover, EU voting rules make it difficult to replace national policies with 
protectionism at the EU level (Hanson 1998: 56). Consensual decision-making on 
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trade policy means that measures favouring the sensitive industries in only a few 
countries will be vetoed by other countries. 
Yet, even if the Commission is more liberal than many of the member states, 
supranational trade policy initiatives are not always aimed at reducing trade barriers. 
In fact, the Commission does not have an a priori tendency to liberalize; it merely 
seeks to develop pan-European policy solutions that do not create cleavages between 
member states in order to avoid deadlock. Liberalization happens to be a pan-
European solution, but pan-European regulation is also possible. Many have noted 
that the liberalization objectives of the EU often appear like an exercise in 
international regulation rather than the complete abandonment of all trade barriers 
(Winters 2001; Cremona 2001). Alasdair Young (2002) argues that EU external 
policy is most accurately described as an attempt to extend European cooperation to 
third countries. Moreover, regulatory harmonization within the single market 
infrequently creates “regulatory peaks”, as many of the prominent trade disputes 
between the EU and third countries illustrate (Young 2004). In other words, even 
though we should expect protectionist lobbying to employ national routes and 
businesses supporting liberalization to develop partnerships with the European 
Commission, we might also find lobbyists defending new kinds of regulatory 
protectionism that applies equally across member states.5 
                                                 
5 Regulatory protectionism can be especially successful if elaborated in cooperation with directorate-
generals specialized in a particular sector of economic activity. While DG Trade might push for trade 
liberalization, DG Agriculture, DG Industry, DG Transport and Energy or DG Information Society will 
be more likely to elaborate sector specific regulatory arrangements that enshrine advantages for 
European industries in world markets. I thank Manfred Elsig for raising this point. 
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2. Lobbying for protectionism or liberalization 
What does this mean for industry lobbyists and why is it relevant to 
distinguish between classic protectionism and pan-European regulatory 
protectionism? With few exceptions, European trade policy applies to all industries 
alike, so we should expect producers and firms to move their lobbying efforts to the 
supranational level. Surprisingly, this is not the case. By comparing lobbying in 
agriculture and textiles and clothing, we can see that protectionist lobbying is only 
successful when it is supported within the member states, which is why lobbyists 
eventually have to concentrate their efforts on the domestic route. Tellingly, lobbyists 
targeting the Commission to maintain import restrictions on textiles and clothing were 
ignored in the absence of member state pressure. By contrast, a study of the service 
trade shows how business lobbyists have been able to influence the European 
Commission’s objective once they embraced liberalization as a policy objective. This 
was easy for the exporting companies in financial services, but required an important 
redefinition of policy demands in telecommunication services, where firms were not 
naturally inclined to support liberalization. Distinguishing between the types of 
demands can thus help to explain the success or failure of trade policy lobbying in the 
EU.  
2.1. Resistance to foreign competition: agriculture and textiles  
2.1.1. Agriculture 
The agricultural market, one of the most integrated markets in the European 
Union, is characterized by a highly centralized structure of interest representation at 
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the supranational level: the Comité des organizations professionnelles agricoles 
(COPA), founded in 1958. Despite the close, traditionally quasi-corporatist relations 
between COPA and the EU Institution on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 
lobbying on multilateral trade issues has, most importantly, passed through national 
channels. Starting in the 1980s, the crisis of CAP dissolved the consensus between 
national agricultural organizations and left space for a more pluralist organization of 
agricultural interest groups. Several unified demonstration in Brussels 
notwithstanding, the diversification of interest representation implies that interest 
representation on external trade is mediated by the member states (Delorme 2002). 
Indeed, during the first years of the Uruguay Round, national farmer 
organizations, most notably in France and Germany, lobbied heavily to ensure that 
their governments did not cede ground on agricultural liberalization. In December 
1990, strong internal divisions between the EU member states led to a rejection of the 
settlement on agriculture that was supposed to conclude the Uruguay Round. The 
Commission hoped to strike a compromise by tying the multilateral negotiations to a 
reform of CAP. At the beginning of the CAP reform process, the Commission had 
tried to consult with national farmers’ unions, but eventually abandoned its contacts 
when it realized that farmers were not willing to move away from the status quo (Vahl 
1997: 149). As a consequence, the Commission negotiated directly with the member 
states and isolated itself from the critical farmers’ union. In reaction, “farmers’ unions 
simply intensified their lobbying activities at the member state level” to block CAP 
reform and concession in the GATT negotiations (Van den Hoven 2002: 11). Once 
the Commission succeeded in negotiating a compromise with the U.S. at Blair House 
in Washington, D.C. in 1992, it was again the French government which threatened to 
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veto the agreement. Since Germany had shifted its position to support the Blair House 
Accord, France ended up in an isolated position and did not carry through its threat 
(Balaam 1999: 60).  
During the new round of trade talks, opposition to liberalization was also 
channelled through national routes. France and Ireland publicly criticized the 
Commission’s negotiating position during the Doha ministerial meeting, arguing that 
the defence of CAP ought to be the EU’s priority for negotiations (Van den Hoven 
2002: 19-20). Until the time of writing, member state disagreement has severely 
constrained the Commission’s room for manoeuvre in the current negotiations. It is 
thus member state opposition, not agricultural lobbying, that explains development in 
agricultural trade negotiations. For the Commission, successful negotiations require 
neutralizing member state opposition, not resisting protectionist lobbyists at the 
supranational level. 
2.1.2. Textiles and clothing 
As in agriculture, protectionism in textiles and clothing was achieved through 
national strategies. Inversely, when interest groups had to start interacting with the 
European Commission, lobbying for protectionism became increasingly difficult. 
Protectionism in textiles and clothing dates was enshrined in four successive 
Multifibre Arrangements (MFA) from 1974 to 1994 and ended with a Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, which stipulated that the MFA will be phased 
out over a ten-year period.6  
                                                 
6 For an historical overview, see Aggarwal Vinod K. Aggarwal (1985), Liberal 
Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade. Berkeley: 
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Throughout the MFA period, the orientation of the respective arrangements 
resulted from intense intergovernmental bargaining. The relatively moderate EC 
policy on MFA I (1974-6) was influenced by the liberal German and Dutch approach, 
which resisted U.S. calls for strict protectionism. Since the European industry had not 
yet lost its comparative advantage, the Commission did not want to intervene. Once 
the textiles and clothing trade balance deteriorated, the Committee for the Textile 
Industries in the European Community (COMITEXTIL) lobbied heavily in Brussels 
to draw attention to the dramatic fall in employment in the sector. Unimpressed and 
doubting the reliability of the figures, the Commission maintained that it would be 
wrong to give in to these protectionist demands. But things were different in the 
Council. Member states felt concerned about the health of their textiles and clothing 
industries and announced that the Community policy should be centred on voluntary 
export restraints (Ugur 1998: 660). In the difficult economic times of the late 1970s, 
the UK had joined France and Ireland’s strict protectionist demands, supported also in 
Italy. Moderate countries seeking a simple renewal of the MFA were eventually 
outnumbered (Aggarwal 1985: 146). Faced with insistent member states determined 
to protect what they considered to be their national interests, the Commission had to 
switch to a protectionist trade policy during MFA II and MFA III (1977-85).  
The shift toward gradual liberalization under MFA IV (1986-1994) was tied to 
the desire of developed countries to open up trade in services and other new issues 
                                                                                                                                            
University of California Press. and Hoekman and Kostecki Bernard M. Hoekman and 
Michel M. Kostecki (2001), The Political Economy of the World Trading System. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.. 
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(Woolcock 2000: 378). Yet protectionist lobbying at the European level had not 
ceased in 1985. COMITEXTIL worked hard to draw attention to the difficult situation 
in the sector. In spite of this tactic’s previous success, the industry’s difficulties were 
seized on by opponents of textile protection to show that earlier measures had not left 
the industry better off. As European countries turned away from Keynesian demand 
management, member state support faded. Despite intense lobbying from 
COMITEXTIL, trade unions and other textile associations, national representatives on 
the Article 133 Committee and COREPER were able to work out a compromise in 
favour of gradual liberalization. In 1989, moreover, the Commission accepted the 
midterm review of the Uruguay Round, against the insistence of the textile industry 
association (Ugur 1998: 663). The Commission later issued a communication 
stressing that restructuring was appropriate for the industry and Sir Leon Brittan 
announced to a shocked industry audience that “the textile industry is a normal 
industry,” (cited in Scheffer 2003). Without the backing of the member states, 
protectionist lobbying in textiles and clothing at the EU level was a failure. 
In a last attempt to secure special treatment in EU trade policy, industry 
representatives formed a new coalition in the early 1990s, the European Textile and 
Clothing Coalition, to avert the dangers of the new policy orientation. Simultaneously, 
the European Trade Union Committee for Textiles began to organize meetings and 
demonstrations. All of these efforts were largely ignored by the Commission, which 
insisted that the industry’s problems had to be resolved by securing market openings 
in third countries (Ugur 1998: 664-5). At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the 
EU had endorsed the WTO’s Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, which was to 
phase out all protection by January 2005.  
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Faced with this new reality, the textile industry had to reorganize. 
COMITEXTIL, while other textile associations founded a new European association 
in 1995: the European Apparel and Textile Organization (EURATEX). Needing to 
work with the Commission in order to influence or delay the integration of sensitive 
categories into the WTO agreement, EURATEX launched a review of its strategy 
(Scheffer 2003). In contrast to the unsuccessful pressure lobbying that had 
characterized earlier protectionist demands, European industry representatives 
decided to engage in a more cooperative manner with the European Institutions.  
As Jacomet (2000: 307) underlines, the new “interactive lobbying” during the 
WTO negotiations in the early 1990s had differed sharply from previous activities 
because lobbyists had to accept a “trade-off” in the policy demands they could voice: 
they exchanged the elimination of the MFA for market access in third countries. Only 
by embracing a policy stance centred on market access did textile lobbyists maintain 
their contacts with the European Institutions. Indeed, the selection logic of the EU 
Institutions forcing European industry representatives to reframe their demands helps 
to explain why the EU textile industry became supportive of foreign market access 
while its American counterpart continued to press for strict protection. The need to 
supply a specific kind of lobbying at the supranational level also becomes clear in the 
reorganization of EURATEX. As a result of its internal review, EURATEX decided 
to develop a more comprehensive policy “in order to be seen as relevant partners for 
policy-makers,” (Scheffer 2003: 108). Faced with very heterogeneous demands from 
its national associations, EURATEX now aims not to counteract national lobbying, 
but to promote synergies between domestic and European efforts. After the lobbying 
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failures of the past, EURATEX’s approach today is to focus on pan-European stances 
to maintain its leadership role at the EU level.  
At the end of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing’s transition period in 
2005, European companies complained vigorously about Chinese competition. Still, 
they acknowledged that the abandonment of the quota system was beyond their 
control. Whether they liked it or not, “the affected companies had to accept the new 
logic in order to be able to influence the calendar, the modalities of the new measures 
or the transition aid,” (Jacomet 2004: 5). In the absence of member state pressure for 
protection, successful business–government relations at the supranational level 
required going along with the liberalization objective of the European Commission.  
2.2. Developing pan-European policy solutions: trade in services 
The multilateral General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) that entered 
into force with the founding of the WTO in 1995 is often cited as a prime example of 
business influence over trade policy. According to many observers, the American 
financial service companies and its Coalition for Service Industries played a key role 
in bringing the issue onto the international negotiating table (Drake and Nicolaïdis 
1992; Sell 2000; Woll 2004). On the European side, firms were much less in evidence 
during the service negotiations in the Uruguay Round and the sectoral negotiations 
that followed GATS. However, the European Commission did consult extensively 
with industry representatives in two sectors: financial services and telecommunication 
services (Van den Hoven 2002: 10). 
 23
2.2.1. Financial services 
At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, countries agreed to continue sectoral 
negotiations on financial services to obtain more detailed liberalization commitments. 
By the initial deadline in 1995, the U.S. declared itself unsatisfied with the existing 
offers and walked out of the negotiations. Behind the position of the U.S. government 
was the frustration of the U.S. private sector, which had helped to put services on the 
WTO agenda and now felt that it was not achieving sufficient market access in 
foreign countries (Woolcock 1998). 
Faced with the U.S. refusal, the EU assumed the leadership in the financial 
service talks and encouraged WTO members to negotiate an interim agreement 
without the U.S. in 1995 and to extend the talks until December 1997. Over the next 
two years, the European Commission went out of its way to gain the support of 
European financial service firms so it could counter the influence of the U.S. private 
sector. Indeed, representatives of “Citicorp, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and the 
insurance companies – particularly the American Insurance Group and Aetna – 
established command posts” near the WTO headquarters and conferred with 
American negotiators throughout the financial service talks (Andrews 1997). 
Business lobbying comparable to the activities of the U.S. Coalition of Service 
Industries was only common in the United Kingdom, where financial service firms 
had founded British Invisibles in 1986, an association to promote the interests of its 
members, which later turned into International Financial Services London. Part of 
British Invisibles was the working committee LOTIS (the acronym for Liberalisation 
Of Trade In Services), which dates back to the early 1980s (see Wesselius 2001). For 
the European Commission, working with these private sector associations was crucial, 
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because they felt that European firms could best engage the U.S. private sector in a 
continued dialogue. Transnational business negotiations began at the World Economic 
Forum in Davos, Switzerland in 1996. U.S., UK and European financial service 
representatives met in the office of British Invisibles and eventually formed the 
Financial Leaders Group to promote the interests of the affected firms on both sides of 
the Atlantic (Sell 2000: 178).  
The European Trade Commissioner, Sir Leon Brittan, welcomed the creation 
of this group and worked closely with its European chair, Andrew Buxton of Barclays 
Bank (Wesselius 2002: 7). For the EU negotiators, the Financial Leaders Group was 
an important channel through which they hoped to moderate U.S. expectations, in 
particular by addressing the concerns of the U.S. private sectors, which had previously 
brought the talks to a standstill (Woolcock 1998: 33). Sir Leon Brittan had long been 
frustrated with the lack of support among European companies and tried to encourage 
them to mobilize around the issue of international trade liberalization. A 
representative of the European service sector remembers: “At one occasion, he finally 
invited a series of CEOs for dinner and said something to the effect of ‘either you will 
get organized, or I will take the decisions single-handedly’.”7 
In contrast to the aggressive lobbying of U.S. financial service firms, European 
firms entered negotiations not so much on their own initiative but, most importantly, 
in response to the active encouragement of the European Commission, which was 
looking for business support for the difficult financial service talks in the 1990s. The 
close business–government relationship that developed in the EU after 1996 was 
                                                 
7 Interview with the author in Brussels, November 13, 2002.  
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based on the shared aim of liberalizing the sector. After an unexpected change in the 
position of the Asian countries during the currency crisis in 1997, negotiators finally 
reached an agreement on December 12, 1997. Yet the cooperation between financial 
service firm leaders and the European Commission went even further than the 
Financial Service Agreement. In 1998, Sir Leon Brittan asked Andrew Buxton once 
again to create a select group of, this time, purely European business leaders. The 
European Service Forum, launched on January 26, 1999, today ensures the 
Commission’s continued support for the liberalization of service industries and 
consequentially benefits from privileged access to trade policy-making at the 
supranational level. Had European firms not supported liberalization, it is highly 
unlikely that they would have been able to work so closely with EU policy-makers. 
2.2.2. Telecommunications 
In telecommunications, the position of firms was more difficult. European 
network operators had long benefited from privileged positions as monopoly 
providers in their home countries. The WTO’s sectoral negotiations on basic 
telecommunications liberalization from 1994-1997 coincided with the liberalization of 
the internal EU market. While firms wanted to benefit from foreign market access 
once telecommunication markets were liberalized, they were also concerned about 
protecting their home market positions. Solicited by the European Commission, 
European operators therefore adopted a pro-liberalization stance in the mid-1990s, 
which allowed them to follow and influence the content of the multilateral negotiation 
in the WTO while still maintaining close ties to their home governments in order to 
defend national interests on specific issues. 
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In fact, the project of European telecommunications liberalization had met 
with very different echoes in European member states. The United Kingdom and the 
Nordic countries had introduced competition in their home markets and pushed 
actively for Europe-wide liberalization. Germany, France and the Benelux countries 
had initiated more moderate reforms, but had their reservations about complete 
liberalization. However, the Southern countries – Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal – 
were not interested in changing their telecommunication systems (see Noam 1992). 
The struggle between the European Commission and the member states over internal 
telecommunications liberalization began in 1987 and is recounted elsewhere in great 
detail (e.g. Sandholtz 1998; Thatcher 1999b; Eliassen and Sjøvaag 1999; Holmes and 
Young 2002). After some judicial wrangling over EU competences, the Commission 
was able to propose the liberalization of telephone services in 1993 and infrastructures 
in 1994. In 1996, member states reached agreement on implementing liberalization by 
January 1, 1998. What is important for an understanding of the WTO involvement of 
European network operators is the consultation efforts made by the European 
Commission during the internal liberalization project. 
Trying to gain support in the face of member state resistance, Martin 
Bangemann, European Commissioner for Industry, Information Technology and 
Telecommunications, called together a group of “wise men”, leaders from the telecom 
industry and user companies, in order to prepare a communication on the international 
competitiveness of European telecommunications. The consultation procedure is 
noteworthy, because the Commission dealt with the senior officials of the national 
operators directly and encouraged them to evaluate their position in the 
internationalizing market. Under pressure from user companies and competition from 
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liberalized countries attracting telecommunications-based firms, operators in France 
and Germany began to concentrate on reform and internationalization, and therefore 
supported the EU liberalization (Thatcher 1999a). With the backing of the leading 
European telecommunications providers, the report issued by the senior official 
group, the so-called Bangemann report, was important for encouraging member states 
onto the route of liberalization (High-Level Group on the Information Society 1994). 
Lobbying on multilateral liberalization was closely connected to internal 
liberalization. Before 1996, European network operators were not involved in the 
sectoral negotiations that had begun in 1994 (Woll 2004). With the announcement of 
the 1998 deadline, the European Telecommunication Network Operators association 
(ETNO), founded in 1992, was able to gather support for multilateral liberalization as 
well. A member of the WTO working group recalls: “We had good relations with the 
European Commission. There was no opposition: the Commission works for Europe 
and we work for Europe as well.”8 ETNO fully supported the multilateral negotiations 
and helped the Commission negotiate the Basic Telecom Agreement in 1997.  
Indeed, most operators affirm having been in support of the 1997 agreement 
and having engaged actively through their European association throughout the talks. 
Despite these declarations, many operators had concerns about losing their national 
privileges and so used their national ties to maintain a degree of control over access to 
their home markets. Telefónica, the Spanish operator, for example, insisted on 
restricting non-EC investment to the Spanish market, despite the fact that it had 
become an important overseas investor in Latin America. When the U.S. criticized the 
                                                 
8 Interview with the author in Brussels, September 3, 2003. 
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Spanish position, negotiations over the case turned into bilateral talks between the 
Commission and the Spanish government, which had taken up the highly politicized 
issue (Niemann 2004: 399). Similarly, network operators in other countries tried to 
guarantee national privileges through the implementation of the EC regulatory 
framework. Member states and their regulatory agencies enjoyed immense freedom to 
determine interconnection terms and tariffs between networks or to impose universal 
service conditions. In contrast to British Telecom, which received no extra funding for 
universal service, France Télécom had the right to obtain compensation (Thatcher 
1999a). At the same time that ETNO was lobbying for reciprocal liberalization of 
basic telecommunication services through the WTO, national operators were seeking 
to maintain regulatory advantages, i.e. restrictions to foreign market access, through 
their national governments. 
3. Conclusion 
The comparison between agriculture, textiles and clothing, financial services 
and telecommunication services shows that trade policy lobbying in the EU is marked 
by a two-channel logic. Protectionism (agriculture) is best defended through the 
national route, while lobbying in support of liberalization (financial services) happens 
at the supranational level, in particular through contacts with the European 
Commission. Companies that seek both foreign market access and restrictions to 
competition in their home markets therefore tend to adopt an ambiguous position: 
they choose to support liberalization “in general” in order to stay in contact with the 
European Commission, but also work through their member states to maintain 
national restrictions (telecommunications). Without the backing of their home 
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governments, protectionist lobbying that impedes European market integration is 
unsuccessful at the supranational level (textiles and clothing). In trade policy, firms 
thus face a trade-off. If they want to maintain good relations with the European 
Commission, they have to frame their demands in terms of pan-European solutions, 
which often means moving away from their immediate interest. 
The entrepreneurial role of the European Commission in creating public–
private contacts on trade policy has several implications. First of all, not just 
businesses but also other interest groups, such as environmental or social NGOs, can 
be solicited for input into the European trade policy process. As current consultation 
demonstrates, the Commission has indeed made an effort to include an ever broader 
range of actors in order to increase its legitimacy and work towards a policy 
consensus (Woolcock 2000). The increasing importance of NGO consultation on trade 
issues means that firms are now obliged to work on their public image. One business 
representative of a petroleum company even estimated that 80% of his public affairs 
responsibilities concern contacts with NGOs, not governments.9  However, firms 
remain the principal source of expertise on trade barriers and will therefore come into 
their own whenever the EU seeks to increase its leverage vis-à-vis trading partners 
such as the U.S.. While NGOs may affect the atmosphere of trade negotiations, it is 
important not to overestimate the direct influence of public interest groups, even 
though the Commission tries to take their opinion into account through the Civil 
Society Dialogue (De Bièvre and Dür 2007).  
                                                 
9 Cited by Dominique Jacoment, board member of EURATEX, at a book conference on “Interest 
groups and the State in France,” CEVIPOF – Sciences Po, Paris, on January 11, 2007.    
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Second, the complexity of the strategic interactions in European trade policy 
caution against superficial analyses of trade policy demands in the EU. Because of the 
two-channel logic, we should expect to find many firms declaring themselves in 
favour of trade liberalization, simply because this ensures them greater access to the 
EU trade negotiators. A study of trade preferences thus needs to distinguish between 
the strategic positions of firms and their underlying preferences, which might be much 
more ambiguous than the official declarations would lead us to believe.  
Finally, the comparison between the various business–government relations 
shows that European trade policy lobbying is complex. To assume that trade policy 
simply reflects producer demands, as many have suggested in the case of the U.S., 
would be to miss important aspects of public–private relations in the EU. While firms 
might capture their government’s positions or even the supranational agenda in certain 
cases, the Commission also instrumentalizes European firms and even affects the 
content of their lobbying demands. This runs counter to the common assumption that 
industry demands and governments simply execute trade policy. Such a demand-side 
conception of policy-making runs through classic trade theory, international political 
economy and the economic analysis of business-government interactions. This article 
has tried to demonstrate that it is inappropriate for an understanding of European trade 
policy.  The EU’s common commercial policy results as much from producer 
demands as it does from the complex decision-making procedures, the institutional 
self-interest of public actors and the power struggles created by their interaction. 
Considering the EU institutions as the passive supplier of trade regulation obscures 
some of the most crucial mechanisms of this policy process.  
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